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Abstract
We consider the problem of detecting an epidemic in a population where in-
dividual diagnoses are extremely noisy. The motivation for this problem is the
plethora of examples (influenza strains in humans, or computer viruses in smart-
phones, etc.) where reliable diagnoses are scarce, but noisy data plentiful. In
flu/phone-viruses, exceedingly few infected people/phones are professionally di-
agnosed (only a small fraction go to a doctor) but less reliable secondary signa-
tures (e.g., people staying home, or greater-than-typical upload activity) are more
readily available.
These secondary data are often plagued by unreliability: many people with the
flu do not stay home, and many people that stay home do not have the flu. This pa-
per identifies the precise regime where knowledge of the contact network enables
finding the needle in the haystack: we provide a distributed, efficient and robust
algorithm that can correctly identify the existence of a spreading epidemic from
highly unreliable local data. Our algorithm requires only local-neighbor knowl-
edge of this graph, and in a broad array of settings that we describe, succeeds even
when false negatives and false positives make up an overwhelming fraction of the
data available. Our results show it succeeds in the presence of partial information
about the contact network, and also when there is not a single “patient zero,” but
rather many (hundreds, in our examples) of initial patient-zeroes, spread across the
graph.
1 Introduction
Any study, analysis or curbing of an epidemic begins with the fundamental question:
is the phenomenon that we experience indeed an epidemic? The identification of such
processes, be they malicious malware spreading on computer networks, memes on so-
cial networks, or trends in public opinion, is of major interest across several disciplines.
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A common characteristic is a stark absence of reliable information: patients with
flu-like symptoms rarely visit a medical professional. More typical, however, is the
availability of significant amounts of information indicating a secondary signature of
the outbreak: flu patients may stay home from work, infected computers may exhibit
somewhat encumbered performance, adopters of a new technological trend (e.g., smart-
watch) may show new usage patterns, or may simply “self-report.” While more plenti-
ful, such data may be riddled with false positives and negatives.
Further complicating the problem is the fact that the underlying network is rarely
fully known and in practice it may be possible to recover only a very limited, local,
subgraph near any infected node. In the setting of an epidemic, there may be multiple
epidemic sources rather than a single “patient zero.” In the early phase of the HIV
epidemic, this was precisely the nature of the data, since “patient zero” was unknown,
and a “hidden backbone” connected the initially identified patients (Auerbach et al.
(1984)).
This paper addresses the algorithmic and statistical challenges that this problem
poses on large scale networks. We consider the basic robust graph-learning problem in
the most dire information-restricted setting: at some instant in time we are informed
that a given subset of nodes exhibiting unusual behaviour (in the computer setting)
or are sick. Exact reporting times are unaccessible, and moreover we assume we are
unable to observe the time evolution of the sickness reporting process. Given this
single snapshot in time, the statistical inference problem is to determine if there is
an epidemic, spreading in a diffusive process, which propagates through the network
from one or possibly many initial nodes, or rather nodes have become infected via an
independent, external mechanism.
Algorithmically, we seek an efficient, scalable algorithm with minimal computa-
tional and information requirements. In particular, we assume each node has some
knowledge of its neighbourhood (our simulations show that this too need only be ap-
proximate).
Often, the two processes of random infection and epidemic spread, exist in parallel.
For example, a video may be posted by multiple members in a social network, and
spread across the network by sharing; technology trends may be spread by mass-media
advertisement, as well as word-of-mouth effects. We discuss this possibility explicitly,
and we ask which proliferation mechanism dominates: are more people exposed to
this media by their friends, or is it more common to watch it first through an external
website.
We describe a class of algorithms for this decision making, or statistical hypothesis
testing problem. Our algorithm requires only local information, and it is computation-
ally efficient. Furthermore, the algorithm can be applied in a distributed fashion. Our
theoretical results show that it works even when the fraction of false negatives and pos-
itives goes to 1 – i.e., even as an overwhelming majority of information we see is in
fact false. Our simulation results corroborate this finding.
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2 Problem definition, related work and our contribu-
tion
In this section we describe the basic model we consider, review related work, and then
explain our contributions.
2.1 The Basic Model
The problem we consider is an extension of the scenario described in Milling et al.
(2012, 2013). Consider a graph G = (V,E), where the number of nodes is N =
|V |. The decision making task at hand is distinguishing between the two following
alternative scenarios.
• An epidemic: At time t = 0, an arbitrary subset of nodes is infected. The in-
fection then spreads according to a standard suceptible-infectedmodel (Ganesh
et al. (2005)). That is, infected nodes infect their neighbors according to an ex-
ponential clock set on each edge. We denote the set of infected nodes at time
T as S = S(T ), and the infection size as |S| = α(N)N . At this time, each
infected node reports it is infected with probability q(N). We denote the set of
truly reporting nodes by Sr ⊆ S, and thus call S \ Sr the false negatives. In ad-
dition, there are f |Sr| nodes, picked uniformly over the network, that also report
infected. The intersection of these nodes with Sc, represent false positives. A
reporting process illustration is presented in Fig 2.1.
• Uniform reporting: Each node, independently of all others, reports an infection
with some probability. The problem is most interesting when this probability is
chosen so that the expected numbers of reporting nodes in each scenario match.
Thus in summary, the key parameters that define our setting are as follows: N is the
total number of nodes; α(N) is the fraction of nodes ultimately infected, denoted by
S; q(N) is the probability that a node in S will report, and hence (1 − q) is the false
negative rate; f controls the fraction of false positives, which scale as f/(1 + f), and
hence goes to 100% as f →∞.
Many settings exhibit the above structure. Influenza and allergies are known to
produce similar symptoms – without a professional diagnosis, these may often be con-
fused, even more so when the only indication of either is absence from work or school.
Influenza of course is the epidemic, whereas allergies affect near and distant neighbors
independently. Technology adoption shares similar traits. Word of mouth advertis-
ing spreads like an epidemic, where as mass media advertisement affects customers
independently.
A sample reporting map of the two processes is displayed in Fig. 2.2. When the
reporting probability increases, q(N) → 1, there exists a large connected component
with a ball-like shape about the set of “patient-zero”s and the problem is easier. Like-
wise, the problem is more difficult when f(N) → ∞, as the truly reporting nodes are
washed out by the sea of falsely reporting nodes. We describe a class of algorithms that
is shown to converge correctly even in settings where q(N)→ 0 and f(N)→∞.
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Figure 2.1: An illustration of the epidemic reporting process. The contagion spans the
red nodes, numbered by the infection order, starting from “patient zero”, numbered
by one. The infected network fraction is α = 0.25 . There are two truly reporting
nodes, (q = 0.4) denoted by red and yellow stripes. In addition, there are two more
false positives (f = 1), in black and yellow stripes.
Figure 2.2: Reporting map samples. The reporting nodes are in yellow. (left) A report-
ing sample in a uniform reporting setting. (right) An epidemic reporting scenario map.
It is difficult to distinguish between the two hypotheses visually.
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2.2 Prior Work
The predictive (forward) analysis of our SI model, as in (Ganesh et al. (2005)), is tightly
related to results in First Passage Percolation theory (Blair-Stahn (2010)). These and
related works focus on modeling the epidemic spread characteristics, for example, es-
timating the infection rate for different topologies (e.g., Gopalan et al. (2011)), pre-
dicting the first time the infection exceeds a given boundary, and so on. These are,
therefore, prediction problems, or forward problems: given the initial conditions, pre-
dict what happens in the future.
Our work focuses on the inverse question: given (a noisy version of) what hap-
pened, solve the inference problem to decide if the process is an epidemic or a random
illness. Recently, related inference questions have gained considerable attention. Of
particular interest are estimating the model parameters, such as transmission rate, ei-
ther by MCMC methods (Streftaris & Gibson), or a Bayesian approach (Demiris &
O’neill). Another frequently discussed question is the identification of the epidemic
source (e.g., Shah & Zaman; Karamchandani & Franceschetti (2013)).
The work that most closely relates to ours paper is Milling et al. (2012, 2013).
They consider a similar model, and seek to solve the same problem. The key dif-
ferences here are that the algorithm and analysis are completely different, with some
important consequences. In those works, the authors rely on tools from first passage
percolation, which in some settings (for some graph topologies, for initial infection
conditions) may be fragile. For example, it is not clear if the algorithms given there
are able to handle large numbers of initial seeds. Our results in Section 5 indicate that
our algorithm is largely insensitive to the number of initial infections, and works well
for even hundreds of spread out “patients zero.” A second important difference comes
on the algorithmic front. Our algorithm is inherently local. As we describe below, it
essentially counts nodes with many infected neighbors, at a high level bearing similar-
ity to triangle-counting as a proxy for graph clustering (Watts & Strogatz (1998)). This
allows our algorithm to be run in parallel, and most significantly, requires only local
knowledge of the graph – something that may be critical in applications. In Section
5 we compare the performance of our new algorithm, and find that both on synthetic
(e.g., Erdos-Renyi) graphs as well as real-world networks (e.g., part of the Facebook
graph) our algorithm produces statistically much better results, and significantly less
computational cost. As we explain below, our algorithm’s running time scales with the
number of reporting infected nodes, which may be far smaller than the number of total
nodes.
2.3 Our Contributions
There are two factors which control the “difficulty” of the hypothesis testing problem
we have posed. First, the more the false negatives (i.e., the smaller the set Sr), the more
the epidemic statistically resembles the random illness. Second, in the limit when all
infected nodes report, the presence (or absence) of a large connected component is
easy to test, and sufficient to solve the decision problem. Finally, the topology of the
graph itself plays an important role. The more connected the graph is, the more the two
processes become statistically identical. In the limiting case where the contact network
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is the complete graph, the two processes are indistinguishable.
From the algorithmic standpoint, there is a further regime of interest: the very small
infection setting. It is interesting to understand in this setting, how well an algorithm
using only minimal graph information, can perform.
Our contributions are statistical and algorithmic, and address both regimes dis-
cussed above. Specifically, the key contributions of this work are as follows.
• Algorithm: We provide a simple distributed algorithm that runs in time linear in
the number of reporting infected nodes, can be easily parallelized, and requires
minimal knowledge of the graph: each infected node is required to know only
information about its local neighborhood.
• Statistical Performance: We give sufficient conditions for our algorithm to cor-
rectly identify the infection cause (epidemic or random). In particular, we give
conditions that guarantee that our algorithm succeeds even when the number of
infected nodes is a O(N), i.e., a constant fraction of all the nodes. We also con-
sider the small-infection regime. We show here that our algorithm succeeds even
if each node only knows the graph up to its 1-hop neighbors.
• Experiments: we provide experiments on synthetic (random) graphs, as well
as real-world graphs. We show that our algorithm’s performance is at least as
good as the theory predicts. Moreover, its efficiency allows it to scale easily to
very large networks. We compare to state-of-the-art and demonstrate that our
algorithm is both faster and more accurate.
3 The Algorithm: Hotspot Aggregator
The intuition behind our algorithm is simple: in an epidemic, having sick neighbors is
more common than in the case of a random illness.
Definition 1. For Bi(l) denoting the radius-l ball about node i, and NNi(K) denoting
the set of the K nearest neighbors of node i, we define the following indicator random
variables:
HNNi (K, s) =
{
1 |{v ∈ NNi(K) ∩ S}| ≥ s
0 otherwise
and a similar indicator, HBi (l, s), for the radius-l ball. These indicators are true
only if there are enough (more than s) reporting nodes in the immediate neighborhood
of i. These are equivalent with appropriate correspondence of l and K, and so we use
them interchangeably. If the indicator evaluates to 1, we call node i a hotspot. The
above intuition suggests that there are more hotspots in an epidemic than in a random
infection. Thus the number of hotspots, i.e., the sum of these indicators over reporting
infected nodes, suggests a threshold test, that can correctly classify the infection cause.
This is precisely the crux of Hotspot Aggregator Algorithm, Algorithm 1.
Theoretical/Practical Implementation. The algorithm depends on the nearest-
neighbor threshold value K, and the parameter T . The theorems that make up our
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Algorithm 1 The hotspot aggregator
Input: Threshold values K, T.
Output: An epidemic or a random reporting scenario
counter← 0
for i = 1 to Nreporting do
counter← counter +HNNi (K,K)
end for
if counter > T then
return epidemic
else
return uniform reporting
end if
main results in the next section, demand a careful choice for K and T that requires ap-
proximate knowledge of the false positive rate and the graph topology. As we detail in
the appendix, for some topologies the values forK and T can be computed analytically.
More generally, the optimal values can be computed through simulation. On the other
hand, our experimental results in Section 5 suggest that the algorithm’s performance
is quite stable. For instance, choosing K corresponding to the r-hop neighborhood in
a graph, for r = 2, 3 yields uniformly good computational results (see Section 5 for
more).
Algorithm Information and Complexity. The complete graph information (its
global structure) requires O
(
N2
)
to encode. In contrast, our algorithm requires only
the vector C, which contains the number of reporting nodes within each local environ-
ment. The length of C is the number of reporting nodes, denoted by Nreporting, where for
many cases of interest, Nreporting can be as small as O(log(N)) or even lower. In addition
to being a parsimonious representation of the information required by our algorithm,
the vector C may be reconstructed by knowledge of only the local neighborhood of the
reporting nodes, rather than the whole graph. As discussed above, such local informa-
tion is often the only reasonably accessible/reliable information.
The algorithm’s complexity is o(Nreporting) and it scales with the number of reporting
nodes (which, again, is typically vanishingly small compared to the to the number
of nodes in the network). Similarly, the memory requirement is also very small and
therefore this algorithm is easily scalable.
Algorithm Performance. As the noise increases, so does the difficulty of the de-
cision problem . In the next section we discuss the convergence properties of the algo-
rithm under extremely noisy conditions and present specific choices for the parameters
T and K. We show that under relaxed topological constraints, the algorithm converges
correctly even when the number of falsely reporting nodes is Θ(N), irrespective of the
number of truly reporting nodes, which may be even ω(1). In an extreme scenario,
where the number of false positives is Θ(N) greater than the truly reporting nodes
number, Corollary 4 shows the local environment about every reporting nodes should
contain Θ(logN) nodes. However, if the number of falsely reporting nodes is o(N),
then it possible to apply the algorithm on a local environment which contains only a
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finite number of nodes, as shown in Theorem 5.
4 Main Results: Correctness & Convergence
Before we proceed, we require some preliminary definitions.The infection boundary is
the set of infected nodes that have a non-infected node in their local neighborhood. An
alternative definition for a boundary is a set of infected nodes for which at least one of
the k nearest neighbors is not infected.
Definition 2. The lth order boundary ∂S(l) is a subset of infected nodes, ∂S(l) ⊆ S,
such that for every i ∈ ∂S(l) we have Bi(l) ∩ Sc 6= ∅, i.e., there exists j /∈ S in
the ball Bi(l). Alternatively, the kth order border set is a subset of infected nodes,
DS(k) ⊆ S, such that for every i ∈ DS(k) we have NNi(k) ∩ Sc 6= ∅. We denote
by γ(k) = 1 − |DS(k)| /|S| the fraction of interior nodes, i.e., nodes for which their
local neighborhood is contained in the infected region.
As discussed in the introduction, this decision problem’s difficulty increases with
the number of false positives and false negatives. The most challenging setting is when
the number of false positives is Θ(N), regardless of the number of truly reporting
nodes, which may be ω(1). We call this the dense regime. As shown in our first theo-
rem, in this regime, if γ(K) is non zero for K = O(logN), the algorithm converges
correctly. Alternatively, assume the number of truly reporting node is also Θ(N). If
γ (K ∈ O(1)) is non zero then the algorithm converges as well.
The algorithm succeeds when the number of hotspots in the epidemic and random
scenarios differ significantly. The hotspot indicator is a Bernoulli random variable,
hence computing the expectation of their sum across reporting nodes is straightforward.
However, these Bernoulli random variables are correlated, in proportion to their graph
distance to each other. Thus the key technical portion of the proof involves controlling
the variance of this sum, by appropriately harnessing large deviation results for sums
of correlated random variables.
Theorem 3. Assume the number of reporting nodes, whether truly reporting or falsely
reporting, is Θ(N). Assume there exist values K, γ such that
a) Pr (γ(K) 6= 0)→ 1 for N →∞
b) K =
⌈
log(γ−1 (f + 1))
⌉
.
Then, the hotspot aggregator algorithm with parameters K and
T =
Nreporting
2
(
γpKin
(f + 1)
+ pK
)
classifies correctly with high probability. The type I error and type II error decay rates
are o (exp(−cNreporting)), where c is a constant that depends on the problem parameters.
As an immediate corollary of this result, we see that in the large-infection-regime,
our algorithm succeeds even as the numbers of false negatives and positives are over-
whelmingly greater than the number of truly infected reporting nodes. The proof fol-
lows immediately from the theorem, and the details are deferred to the appendix.
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Corollary 4. For a large infection with Θ(N) infected nodes (i.e., α = Θ(1) ), the
algorithm converges correctly if conditions (a) and (b) above are satisfied, even when
the reporting probability goes to zero and noise ratio goes to infinity, i.e., q ∈ ω (N−1)
and f ∈ ω (q−1).
In particular, if the number of truly reporting nodes is Θ(N), then the algorithm
converges correctly if γ(K = const) > 0. Alternatively, the algorithm converges
correctly for every network such that γ(K = 2 logN) > 0. This holds, for example,
for grids and tree like networks, even if the noise is f ∈ Θ(N).
Proof. Denote the epidemic (uniform reporting) indicator as I (respectively, I˜ ), the
reporting probability of an infected node in the epidemic scenario by pin.and the node
reporting probability in the uniform reporting scenario as p. In the uniform reporting
scenario, the probability that a local hotspot indicator is true is
Pr (|{v ∈ NNi(k) ∩ Sreporting}| ≥ k) = pk.
Therefore, the expected number of hotspots in the uniform reporting case
∑
i∈V Hi|I˜
is
E
(∑
i∈V
Hi|I˜
)
=
∑
i∈V
E
(
Hi|I˜
)
= Nreportingp
k.
In the epidemic setting, the hotspot number is greater than the interior (non-boundary)
hotspot number. Therefore,
E
(∑
i∈V
Hi|I
)
≥ E
 ∑
i∈S,i/∈DS
Hi|I
 ≥ γNreporting
(f + 1)
pkin
where we used the fact that the expected number of truly reporting nodes isNreporting/ (f + 1)
and applied Lemma 9 (stated in the appendix).
Set T = Nreporting
(
γpkin
(f+1) + p
k
)
/2. Applying Lemma 6, choose
K ≥ log(γ−1 (f + 1)) ≥ log(γ−1 (f + 1))p/pin. (4.1)
Now the key step is to evaluate the error rates, despite the correlation. To do this, we
use a Hoeffding-like large deviation theorem (see Corollary 2.6 in Janson (2004)) for
graph-structured correlation decay patterns. We can form a dependence graph Γ among
these Nreporting random variables, drawing an edge between any two non-independent
random variables. Note, then, that for each two nodes, i and j, the hotspot indicators
Hi and Hj are independent iff the corresponding environments Bi and Bj , or NNi
and NNj are disjoint. The number of nodes in each local environment of the k nearest
neighbors of i is also k, so the number of nodes with disjoint local environments is at
least N − k2. In other words, the maximal node degree in Γ is k2.
Set P = pK , Pin = γpkin/(f + 1). Then, adapting some concentration inequalities
from Janson (2004), we can show that the type I error, EI := Pr
(∑
i∈V Hi|I˜ ≥ T
)
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is bounded by
EI ≤ exp
(
−Nreporting (Pin − P )
2
16 (K2 + 1) (P + (Pin − P ) /6)
)
In the epidemic scenario, the total number of hotspots is at least as great as the
number of interior hotspots. Therefore, the type II error is bounded by
EII = Pr
(∑
i∈V
Hi|I < T
)
≤ Pr
 ∑
i∈S,i/∈DS
Hi|I < T

and similarly, the latter quantity is bounded by
exp
(
−Nreporting (Pin − P )
2
16 (K2 + 1)Pin
)
As shown in the appendix, these errors tend to zero under the conditions of this
theorem.
Applying Theorem 3 and Corollary4. As with the algorithm, applying the the-
orem or corollary requires calculating values of γ(K) and K. As we show in the
appendix, γ(K) can often be explicitly (analytically) computed, and if that is not avail-
able, it can be easily computed numerically. In the appendix, we also present explicit
instructions on the application of the hotspot algorithm for general networks, includ-
ing specific finite size networks for which the statistical ensemble is unknown. When
γ(K) is known, one can simply find the minimal value of K such
K ≥ log (γ(K)) + log (f + 1) ,
and substitute the corresponding value in the threshold. For example, for d-dimensional
grids one can choose K = dlog(f + 1)e and
T =
Nreporting
2
(
pKin
(f + 1)
+ pK
)
,
while for a tree like network, such as an Erdos-Renyi network, choose K such that
K ≥ logK + dlog(f + 1)e and
T =
Nreporting
2
(
pKin
K (f + 1)
+ pK
)
.
If the function γ(K) is not known or if it difficult to describe analytically and solve
for K, one can apply the bound γ(K) ≥ 1/αN in eq. 4.1 and obtain a corresponding
value for the threshold T .
As long as the probability to find a node for which the local environment is con-
tained in the infected region is non-zero, the algorithm converges correctly. This is a
very lenient requirement, which only fails for nearly full-mesh graphs, such that with
high probability, for every ball, either there are less than logN nodes, |Bi(l)| ≤ logN ,
or the number of nodes in the ball is infinitely higher than logN , logN/|Bi(l)| → 0 .
Indeed, an alternative description for uniform reporting is a contagion on an underlin-
ing full mesh grid, and in this case the two processes are identical.
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Small Infections
We now consider the setting of very small infections, and prove that in these settings,
one can take K to be a constant (K ∈ Θ(1)), and moreover can choose this constant
so that even the presence of a single hotspot indicates an epidemic infection.
Theorem 5. Assume the total number of reporting nodes, is N1−β , while the number
of truthfully reporting nodes isNρ and the truly reporting probability is q(N) = N−µ.
Set K = d1/βe−1 . If γ(K) ∈ ω (log−1(N)) , then the hotspot aggregator algorithm
with parameters K and threshold T = 1 classifies correctly with high probability if
Kµ ≤ ρ. In particular, if 1 > β > 0.5, than the hotspot algorithm with K = 1
classifies correctly under the same conditions.
In this last case, the algorithm simply counts the expected number of infected neigh-
boring pairs.
Proof. For each two nodes, i and j, the hotspot indicators Hi and Hj are independent
iff the corresponding environment Bi and Bj are disjoint, Bi∩Bj = ∅, otherwise they
are positively correlated. In the uniform reporting scenario, define the probability that
all the hotspot indicators are false as Pep , Pr (∀i ∈ Nreporting, Hi = 0). The probability
for such event is bounded by:
Pep ≥
Nreporting−1∏
i=0
Pr(Hi = 0, Hj = 0|Bi ∩Bj = ∅)
=
(
1− pk)Nreporting .
Therefore, as p→ 0 ,Nreporting →∞
Pr (∀i ∈ Nreporting, Hi = 0)→ exp
(−pkNreporting)
According to the central limit theorem,Nreporting = pN with high probability. By Ap-
plying Lemma 9 and choosing k such that pk ∈ O(N−1), we have Pr
(
∀i ∈ Nreporting, Hi = 0|I˜
)
→
1.
Similarly to Theorem 3, set Pin = pkin,N
′
reporting = γN reporting/(f+1). In the epidemic
setting, we can again apply Corollary 2.6 in Janson (2004), but now with a deviation of
t = N ′reportingP .
Then, the type II error is bounded by
EII ≤ exp
(
−N
′
reportingP
(
1− (K2 + 1) /4N)
2 (K2 + 1)
)
.
The type II error tends to zero if N ′reportingP → ∞. The latter condition can also be
written as qαγ
(
qK + (αqf)
K
)
∈ ω (N−1), while the condition for the type II correct
convergence is (αqf)K+1 ∈ O(N−1).
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In particular, if Nreporting/N ∈ O(N−0.5), and q2α ∈ ω
(
N−1
)
then it is sufficient to
choose K = 1, i.e., to count the number of infected nearest neighbors pairs.
This result is particularly useful for small infections (for example, α ∈ Θ (N−0.3)).
It shows that it is possible to detect epidemics using the hotspot aggregator algorithm
even when the ratio of the number of false positives to the number of infected nodes
tends to infinity (for example, f ∈ Θ (N0.7)), and the ratio of truly reporting nodes
number to the number of infected nodes tends to infinity (for example, q ∈ Θ (N−0.3)),
a quadratic “needle in a haystack” scenario.
Finally, note that the requirement for the algorithm convergence is that the bound-
ary would not contain all the nodes. Therefore, even if multiple sources of an epidemic
exist, then as long as this condition is satisfied, the algorithm converges correctly. Put
differently, the hotspots aggregator will converge correctly as long as there are sources
that had the chance to infect their local environment, rather than infect a large portion
of the network. Hence, this algorithm is able to identify and nip contagions in the bud.
Next, we deploy this algorithm on both random network models, such as Erdos-
Renyi networks or scale-free networks, and real-world networks, such as an enterprise
email network, the Internet AS topology and Facebook.
5 Experiments
We perform empirical tests of our algorithm on both synthetic and real data. We fo-
cus on demonstrating its accuracy, running time and scalability in numerous settings.
These simulations also demonstrate the ease-of-use of our algorithm in real experi-
ments. While the theorems themselves require some care in choosing the parameters
of the algorithm, here we find that 1, 2, and 3-hop local neighborhoods perform ex-
tremely well across a wide range of settings, including the setting of an overwhelming
number of false positives, and the setting of up to 200 infection seeds (initial infected
nodes).
Synthetic Graphs. We consider the algorithm performance in the acute regime,
where the number of false positives and false negatives each tends to infinity. We
tested this (Fig. 5.1) on an Erdos-Renyi graph in the regime where the giant component
emerges, G(N = 8000, p = 2/N ) (Durrett (2010)). The error rate decays rapidly as
the size of the graph increases, as predicted by Theorem 5, even as the fraction of truly
reporting nodes among the reporting nodes tends to zero. Moreover there are infinitely
more false negatives than true positives, as the network size increases. We also compare
against the Median-ball-algorithm given in Milling et al. (2013). While the Median
algorithm may be converging, we see that the convergence of our algorithms for l =
1, 2, 3, 4 is remarkably faster.
Interestingly, in this experiment, the l = 4 version of our algorithms seems to have
a slightly worse performance compared to l = 1, 2. This is likely because the regime
of G(N, p) we consider has diameter Θ (logN), and thus even 4-hop neighborhoods
are considerable in size.
In real-world networks, the degree distribution often follows a power law. For ran-
dom power law networks, the network diameter is, like in the G(N, p) , Θ(logN), or
even Θ(log (logN)) (Cohen & Havlin (2003)). In such small-world networks, choos-
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Figure 5.1: The mean error rate for different ball radii for an Erdos Renyi graph
G(N, p = 2/N). In this configuration, the number of false reporting nodes tends
to infinity, while the fraction of truly reporting nodes among the reporting nodes tends
to zero. In addition, the true reporting probability tends to zero, so that the number of
false negative is infinitely higher than the number of true positives. Furthermore, the
epidemic size is small,O(N0.3). The simulation details are elaborated in the appendix.
ing a large ball radius deteriorates inference performance due to an overflow of the
local ball about an infected node to an uncontaminated region.
Real World Graphs. We next consider a real world graph, namely, the enterprise
email network of Enron employees (Klimt & Yang). In part, this is motivated by the
fact that many computer viruses spread by email attachments. Figure 5.2 shows the
setting of a small infection, with a very large fraction of false negatives, a large majority
of false positives, and many initial sources of infection. Our results demonstrate the
stability of our algorithm with respect to the number of initial infection seeds. Even
with as many as 200 initial seeds, the performance of our algorithm is hardly affected.
We note again a better performance for radius values r = 1, 2, 3 in our algorithm; this
is for the same reason as discussed above.
Additional instances of diffusive processes are the sharing of viral media and the
adoption of memes on social networks. We examined the identification of such phe-
nomena by testing our algorithm on a network of 63K Facebook contacts (Viswanath
et al. (2009)). Finally, cascades of router failures due to misconfiguration or BGP at-
tacks is a major security concern. We have performed experiments on these graphs as
well, but for space concerns defer these to the appendix.
Last, we tested our algorithm in the presence of noisy network information, to test
robustness to knowledge of local neighborhoods. Indeed, a person may erroneously
estimate the distance to her peers, consequently resulting in an incorrect set of nearest
neighbors, or the deformation of the ball centered about her. In our experiments, we
account for the effect of noisy network information by allowing an expected fraction of
the conceived inter-node distances to increase or decrease by d (when the unmodified
distance is greater than d). Consequently, the inference algorithm is performed on a
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Figure 5.2: The mean error rate as a function of the number of epidemic sources for
Enron email network. The network is comprised ofN = 33, 696 nodes. The number of
infected nodes is small, 0.06N , and the number of truly reporting nodes is miniscule,
0.003N . Finally, for each truly reporting node there are 8 false positives (f = 8). Even
in this challenging situation, the error rate is low.
different network than the one the epidemic evolved on. Note that such a modification
is not symmetric, as one node may correctly estimate the distance to its peer, while its
peer may not. The error rate of our inference algorithm is present in Fig. 5.3. The
results here show that our algorithm is robust to such noisy network knowledge.
In an epidemic scenario, if a reporting node is deep in the infected region, there ex-
ists some buffer to the uninfected nodes at the contagion border, and the overestimation
effect should be negligible. In contrast, if the reporting node’s exterior shell is close to
the border, then the reporting node may mistake an uninfected node as a member of its
local ball and performance may deteriorate. Therefore, we expect that the type II error
should increase with the ball radius and the misestimation rate, expressed in either in-
creased misestimation probability or the true distance deviation. These two effects are
observed in Fig. 5.3. Finally, the type I error is unaffected by this type of topological
noise.
6 Conclusions
Our world becomes increasingly interconnected by multiple different networks. While
this interconnection speeds information transfer and facilitates communication, is it
also increases the likelihood of contagion outbreaks. Depending on the context, such
outbreaks may be computer viruses, opinion trends, or epidemics such as malaria. The
hair-trigger identification of these diffusive processes is crucial and one may be forced
to rely on a single reporting map snapshot in time. Furthermore, a complete knowl-
edge of the underlying network graph is generally unrealistic. We have provided both
analytical proofs and experiments on real data, showing that the hotspot aggregator al-
gorithm solve this statistical inference problem in its dire setting on a wide variety of
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Figure 5.3: The error probability under additional topological noise for an Erdos Renyi
network G(N = 4000, p = 2/N). The mean error is plotted against the probability
that a node will estimate its distance to another node. The fault is equally likely to be an
overestimate or underestimate of one (dashed lines) or two (solid lines) from the true
nodes distance. The number of infected nodes is about 0.2 of the whole population of
N = 4000. The number of true positives is 0.06N , while the number of false positives
is 0.08N .
network and settings. We have shown that this algorithm classifies correctly even when
the rate of false positives and false negatives is infinitely higher than the number of true
positives, as well as in the presence of multiple sources of epidemics.
We have simulated this algorithm both on random networks, such as Erdos-Renyi
graphs or scale-free graphs, and on real world networks, such as Facebook, the Internet
AS-topology and Enron email chain. Our simulations exhibit the exponential decrease
of the error rate with the size of the network, as predicted. In practice, the error rates are
extremely low, even when there are errors in estimating the network structure. Finally,
the complexity of our algorithm is low, and it is clearly scalable, as shown by the low
error rate on the Facebook network of over 60K nodes.
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A Appendix A - Additional lemmas
Lemma 6. Denote the reporting probability of an infected node in the epidemic sce-
nario by pin. Similarly, denote the node reporting probability in the uniform reporting
scenario as p. Then, pin > p.
Proof. First, note that
pin = q + (1− q) fqα
1− qα
= q
(
1 + (1− q) fα
1− qα
)
while
p = (f + 1) qα
Therefore,
pin − p > q + (1− q) fqα
1− qα − (f + 1) qα
=
q
1− qα (1− qα+ (1− q)fα− (f + 1)α (1− qα))
=
q
1− qα
(
1− qα− qfα+ fα− fα− α+ qα2 + fqα2)
=
q
1− qα ((1− α) (1 + qα+ qfα)
> 0
as α > 0.
Lemma 7. The errors expressed in Theorem 3 tends to zero under the corresponding
conditions.
Proof. Set P = pK , Pin = γpkin/(f+1). According to Corollary 2.6 in Janson (2004)
the type I error rate can be bounded by
EI ≤ exp
−Nreporting (P − Pin)2
(
1− (∆(Γ)+1)4Nreporting
)
8 (∆(Γ) + 1) (1− P ) (P + (Pin − P ) /6)

where ∆(Γ) is the maximal degree of the dependency graph Γ. However, ∆(Γ) ≤
max{Nreporting,K2} and therefore,
EI ≤ exp
(
−Nreporting (Pin − P )
2
16 (K2 + 1) (P + (Pin − P ) /6)
)
(A.1)
Set δ = pin− p. First, note that if lim (P − Pin) 6= 0, then this expression tends to
zero. Therefore, if lim δ 6= 0 for N →∞ than the type I error rate tends to zero.
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Recall that
pin ∈ Ω (q + fqα)
δ ∈ Θ(q)
p ∈ Θ (fqα)
And therefore in this case q ∈ Ω(1). Otherwise, assume that lim δ = 0. If
δ/p→ 0
or equivalently, fα ∈ ω(1), the highly noise regime, then to first order in δ/p
(Pin − P )2 → p2k
(
1− 1
γ(f + 1)
)2
with δ = pin − p. Likewise, if δ/p→ const, than we can write
p = g(N)p˜
δ = g(N)δ˜
where p˜→ const 6= 0 and δ˜ → const 6= 0 and
(P − Pin)2 = g2K(N)

(
p˜+ δ˜
)K
γ(f + 1)
− p˜K

2
Therefore, for either K = 1 or K = 2 we have
lim

(
p˜+ δ˜
)K
γ(f + 1)
− p˜K

2
6= 0
and therefore (P − Pin)2 ∈ Θ(p2k) = Θ(δ2k).
Recall that with high probability Nreporting = Np. As,
EI ≤ exp
(−NΘ (p2k+1))
if
(fqα)
2K+1 ∈ ω(N−1),
the type I error tend to 0 for N →∞. In other words, if K is such that
(Nreporting/N)
2K+1 ∈ ω(N−1)
the error tend to 0. Alternatively, if p/δ → 0 then
(Pin − P )2 →
(
γδk
(f + 1)
)2
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and therefore, if
γ2qK/f ∈ ω(N−0.5)
then the algorithm converges correctly.
A similar calculation shows that if this condition holds, then the type II error tends
to 0 for N →∞. Explicitly:
EII ≤ exp
−Nreporting (P − Pin)2
(
1− (∆(Γ)+1)4Nreporting
)
8 (∆(Γ) + 1)P

and following similar reasoning
EI ≤ exp
(
−Nreporting (Pin − P )
2
16 (K2 + 1)Pin
)
and this expression has the same scaling properties as eq. A.1.
Corollary 8. Consider a large infection, where the number of infected nodes is a con-
stant fraction of the number of nodes, α = Θ(1) . The algorithm converge correctly
even when the reporting probability tends to zero as q ∈ ω (N−1) while the noise ratio
tend to infinity f ∈ ω (q−1), as long as conditions a) and b) of theorem 3 are satisified.
In particular, if the number of truly reporting nodes is Θ(N), then the algorithm
converges correctly if γ(K = const) > 0. Alternatively, the algorithm converges
correctly for every network such that γ(K = 2 logN) > 0, for example, grids and tree
like networks, even if the noise is f ∈ Θ(N).
Proof. Note that f < N . If γ 6= 0, then γ < 1/αN . In particular, if the number of
truly reporting nodes is Θ(N), then f ∈ Θ(1).Therefore
K ≥ − log(γ) + log(f)
and substituting the corresponding values in Theorem 3 concludes the proof..
Lemma 9. Consider a binomial random variable X with expectation value pN for
N →∞. Then any sum of Bernoulli random variables Yi obeys
E
(
X∑
1
Yi ≥ c
)
→ E
(
M∑
1
Yi ≥ c
)
E
(
X∑
1
Yi ≤ c
)
→ E
(
M∑
1
Yi ≤ c
)
In other words, we can asymptotically replace the summation over random number
of RVs in the summation over the mean number or RVs.
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Proof. Set M = Np− (Np)2/3. First, note that
E
(
X∑
1
Y ≥ c
)
= E
(
X∑
1
Y ≥ c|X > M
)
Pr(X > M) + E
(
X∑
1
Y ≥ c|X ≤M
)
Pr(X ≤M)
≤ E
(
X∑
1
Y ≥ c|X > M
)
Pr(X > M)
≤ E
(
X∑
1
Y ≥ c|X = M
)
Pr(X > M).
According to Hoeffding’s inequality
Pr(X ≤M) ≤ exp
(
− (Np)1/3
)
.
and therefore
E
(
X∑
1
Y ≥ c
)
≤ E
(
M∑
1
Y ≥ c
)(
1− exp
(
− (Np)1/3
))
Similarly, we can apply Hoeffding’s inequality for M = Np− (Np)2/3 in
E
(
X∑
1
Y ≤ c
)
= E
(
X∑
1
Y ≤ c|X > M ′
)
Pr(X > M) + E
(
M∑
1
Y ≤ c|X ≤M ′
)
Pr(X ≤M)
≤ E
(
X∑
1
Y ≥ c|X ≤M ′
)
Pr(X < M)
while
Pr(X ≥M ′) ≤ exp
(
− (Np)1/3
)
and obtain
E
(
X∑
1
Y ≤ c
)
≤ E
M ′∑
1
Y ≥ c
(1− exp(− (Np)1/3))
but both M,M ′ → Np and this concludes the proof.
B Appendix B - Algorithm application
In order to apply the algorithm, the parameters K and T must be specified, and the
number of nodes in the local environment must be set. We assume that a good estimate
for the reporting probability of an infected node, pin, is known. Note that for large net-
works the reporting probability p can be easily estimated according to p = Nreporting/N .
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Recall that γ(K) is the fraction of infected nodes for which their K nearest neighbor
nodes are also infected is known.
We distinguish between two classes of networks. First we discuss large networks
for which the function γ(K) is known, whether numerically or analytically. As an
example, consider an infinite constant degree tree with degree d. Assume that the
infection, starting from the root, has infected all the nodes up to the m-th level. In this
case, for every node that is deeper than the m− l level of the tree, all the nearest dl are
not infected. The fraction of such nodes is
γ(K = dl) ≤ d
m−l − 1
dm
→ d−l
Therefore, γ(K) = K−1.
As another example, consider a d dimensional grid. In this case, the contagion is
with high probability contained within an l1 ball of radius r = c|S|1/d, with c→ const
forN →∞ (Milling et al. (2012)). The number of nodes on the non-infected bordering
nodes near the surface of such ball is Θ(rd−1). In addition a ball of radius l contains
Θ(ld) nodes. Therefore, the number of interior nodes is at least Θ(rd−1ld). Hence,
γ
(
K ∈ Θ(ld)) ≤ Θ (r−1ld)
Hence for balls of radii K ∈ o (|S|1/d) = o ((αN) 1/d) we have
γ(K)→ 1
In these cases, Theorem 3 provides a prescription for K and T when the number of
reporting nodes is large, Θ(N), while if the number of reporting nodes is small, o(N),
the prescription in Theorem 5 applies
For a finite size network, that is not necessarily sampled from a statistical ensemble,
γ(K) might be not known apriori. Nevertheless,γ(K) may be calculated at a prepro-
cessing stage. This can be done by simulating epidemics according to the scenario
details. Then, for each infected node, calculate the probability that K of its neighbor-
ing nodes are infected, and average over all infected nodes. As an example, the γ(K)
function for the Internet inter-AS topology, which is often considered a scale free net-
work, is presented in Fig. B.1. Note that for any network, and any value of K, if there
is an infected node that K of its nearest neighbors are infected, then γ(K) 6= 0. In this
case, γ ≥ 1/|S|, where|S| is the infection size. The maximal relevant value of K is
log(|S|), according to Theorem 3.
After this preprocessing stage, if the number of reporting nodes is large one applies
Theorem 3 , or Theorem 5 otherwise.
Finally, it is important to note that one can perform multiple tests with various
values of K. If no epidemic occurred, then in all those tests the number of hotspots
should be close to the expected number of a uniform reporting event. If any tests results
is far from this value, then an epidemic occurred. This approach is particularly relevant
if the critical requirement is high specificity, and if no information on the possible
epidemic is available. Note that as there are at most log(N) tests, applying multiple
tests does increase the algorithm complexity appreciably.
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Figure B.1: The probability γ(K) that K nearest neighbors of an infected node will be
infected as well. The plot was generated for the Internet inter-AS graph, composed of
N ≈ 27K nodes. Even for a small infection size (|S| = 0.06N ) the fraction γ(K) is
significant even up to the maximal relevant value of K = log(|S|) ≈ 7.5.
C Appendix C - Additional experiments
In this section we present additional simulations, some of which are described in the
main body of this paper.
First, we considered idenfitiability on an Erds-Renyi graph in the regime where
the giant component emerges, G(N = 8000, p = 2/N ) (Durrett (2010)). We per-
formed 2000 trials for each scenario (epidemic or uniform reporting) and evaluated the
mean number of hotspots as a function of the threshold K for a ball of a given radius.
The resulting graph for a ball of radius l = 3 is presented in Fig. C.1, including the
corresponding standard deviations. The graph shows that, as our theory predicts, the
number of hotspots is indeed a strong statistic for distinguishing between an epidemic
and a random illness. This was followed, as described in the paper, by evaluating the
algorithm performance in the acute regime, where the number of false positives and
false negatives each tends to infinity (Fig. 5.1). In this figure, the infection size is
O(N0.3) while the reporting probability is O(N−0.2). The ratio of false positives to
true positives is O(N0.3). The mean error is the average of the type I and type II error
probabilities, assuming equal likelihoods of an epidemic and a uniform reporting event.
The plot was obtained by Monte Carlo simulations of 2000 trials for each scenario.
We have followed suit and applied the algorithm on real world networks. In Fig.
C.2 the algorithm’s error rate on a subgraph of the Facebook network is presented.
Even though the noise level is extremely high and the infection is tiny, the error rate
is negligible. We have also simulated our algorithm on the Internet autonomous sys-
tem (AS) network, in order to examine whether this algorithm is able to detect failure
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Figure C.1: The mean number of hotspots (and the standard deviation) as a function of
K. The plot was generated for an Erdos Renyi graph G(N = 8000, p = 2/N) and ball
radius l = 3. The simulation parameters are α = 0.13, q = 0.22 and f = 1. The plot
was generated by Monte Carlo simulations of 2000 trials for each scenario.
cascades of BGP routers (Fig. C.3). In both cases, as discussed in Section 5, the al-
gorithm showed very good results, even for the large ball radius l = 4. These results
were obtained in a challenging setting, under a highly noisy environment with multiple
epidemic sources, where only a mere fraction of the nodes truly report. In both cases,
the Median Ball algorithm’s error was close to 0.5, almost as high as a random classi-
fier. While in principle this algorithm might be modified to include multiple seeds, this
modification requires knowledge of seed number, which is rarely known. In addition,
if the Median Ball algorithm are modified, the type I error increases appreciably.
The degree distribution of these networks closely resembles power law. In partic-
ular, the degree distribution of most of this networks is Axα with 3 > α > 2. We
have tested our algorithm on random power law (Fig. C.4). As the number of reporting
nodes increases, there are more positive classifiers in the uniform reporting scenario.
In order to compensate for this effect, one needs to design a classifier for less frequent
events. This is done by increasing the threshold K, which in turn increases the rarity
of the event. Indeed, it is possible to achieve low error rates with small ball radii even
in the presence of a large number of false positives.
While it is often clearer to state the proofs by means of the border set, it is often
simpler to implement the algorithm in terms of a local ball environment. Recall the
definition of the radius-l ball ball indicator
HBi (l, s) =
{
1 |{v ∈ Bi(l) ∩ S}| ≥ s
0 otherwise
.
As the number of nodes in a ball may vary, and due to finite size effects, the optimal
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Figure C.2: The error probability as a function of the number of epidemic sources on
a Facebook graph. The algorithm with ball radii r = 1, 2, 3 correctly classified every
one of the 4000 samples, and the error rate for the ball with radius r = 4 is low as well.
The infected component is composed of only 3% of the entire graph. The number of
truly reporting nodes is a mere 0.3% of the graph. Finally, for each truly reporting node
there are 8 false positives (f = 8).
threshold value T may be different than the corresponding theoretical value. In prac-
tice, one may optimize this threshold value in an independent preprocessing step. In
practice, values close to the theoretical predictions were found adequate in most cases.
25
Figure C.3: The error probability as a function of number of epidemic sources on the
Internet AS graph. The Internet is well known for its ultra small world property, and
the mean distance between nodes is less than four. The best results are achieved using
balls of either r = 2 or r = 3 radius. The number of infected nodes is 6.7% of the 27K
ASs composing the internet. The reporting probability is q = 0.05 so only 0.3% of the
nodes in the graph are truly reporting. Finally, for each truly reporting node there are 8
false positives (f = 8).
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Figure C.4: The error probability as a function of the number of uniformly reporting
nodes to truly reporting nodes (f) in a scale free network. The number of false positives
is approximately f/ (f + 1). The plot was generated using Monte Carlo simulation on
a scale free network of N = 8.4K nodes. There are roughly 0.4N infected nodes,
whereas only 0.1N nodes report their infectious state. The degree distributation is
Pr (deg(i) = x) = Ax−2.5.
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